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THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE - FROM ABSTENTION TO ACTIVISM

Neil J. KLEINMAN
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1. Introduction
A distinctive attribute of the U.S. federal courts is their power to define and
limit their own authority [1]. The act of state doctrine is one expression of this
power, used by the courts to limit their authority in matters involving foreign
governments [2]. While differences in interpretation and application persist, the
doctrine may be simply defined: U.S. courts may not inquire into the validity
of the laws of other governments and their acts performed within their
territories [3].
In some instances, the state or a closely related administrative or commercial entity of the state [41 is the litigant claiming act of state protection. Where
neither the state [5] nor one directly related to the state claims protection [6].
application of the doctrine rests on the theory that the alleged culpability was
the result of state action [7] that cannot or should not be examined under the
doctrine. Thus, the act of state doctrine also effectively bars actions against
private parties who are able to establish that their acts were required by the
state [8].
The doctrine is interwoven with statements of respect for the independence
owed every sovereign state [9], but it is more an expression of "the basic
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers" [10]. Hence, the doctrine may be said to incorporate [11] the "horizontal" character of international law, in which "there is no adequate 'higher law'
available to resolve serious disputes between states", and the "vertical" character of a "federal state", in which there is a "structure ... [of law] ...
effective to overcome most conflicts that arise within it" [12].
This article argues that since the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine has neither been
interpreted nor applied consistently by U.S. courts [131. The scope of the act of
state doctrine has been seriously questioned [14]. Courts have varied sharply on
its application to cases involving economic disputes and government-operated
commercial enterprises [15]. Disagreement may spring from the fact that the
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term "act of state" actually describes not one approach, but three - each with
a different purpose which necessitates a different form of analysis.
The first approach, which this article calls the classical approach, directs the
court to question its constitutional competence when confronted with international disputes. Courts using this approach tend to accept act of state defenses
by emphasizing the principles of federalism embodied in separation of powers
concepts [16]. In contrast, courts that refuse to accept act of state defenses [17]
subordinate the principles of federalism, emphasizing instead the international
interests at stake. The international interests are balanced with domestic
concerns before deciding whether act of state considerations should apply [18].
Balancing approaches to the act of state doctrine fall into two categories.
One form of balancing, which this article calls "prudential", requires courts to
assess the significance of national and foreign interests and the potential effect
of judicial relief on U.S. foreign relations. The other type, which this article
calls "functional", requires courts to heed pronouncements from the executive
branch and legislative "signals" from Congress [19], in addition to weighing
the national interests at stake against the interests of the private plaintiff.
The act of state doctrine was created by the judiciary to maintain its
autonomy within the federal system and to retain its credibility in a world of
conflicting economic ideologies [20]. Hence, the doctrine's utility has become
threatened as courts increasingly engage in conjecture about the state of U.S.
foreign relations. Prudential balancing, espoused in cases like Timberlane
Lumber Co. o. Bank of America [21] and Manninglon Mills v. Congoleum Corp.
[22], undermines the act of state doctrine's rationale - that the federal judiciary
is competent to evaluate national interests abroad only when international
consensus is clear [23]. Similarly, functional balancing, such as that displayed
in the plurality opinion in Alfred Dunhill v. The Republic of Cuba [24], is no less
suspect [25]. Harmonizing [26] the doctrine to complement positions taken by
the political branches subordinates the judiciary to these branches.
The act of state doctrine should not be dependent upon the political
branches for its content. The courts are not dependent upon the political
branches for their power [27]. The doctrine, instead, may be viewed as a
judicially constructed barrier between the courts and legislative and executive
pressures [28]. The preferred analysis, then, should return to the solid ground
provided by the classical approach on which the act of state doctrine is
anchored. The doctrine cannot easily be restored, however. The generalizing
process has gone far afield since the nearly unanimous Supreme Court in
Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatinolast defined the doctrine twenty years ago
[29]. Absent a clear statement from the Supreme Court addressing the doctrine's
constitutional underpinnings, the federal courts will increasingly be drawn into
judging economic disputes beyond their constitutional competence.
This article retraces the gradual fracturing of the act of state doctrine,
analyzing several recent decisions to show how courts have manipulated the
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doctrine to reach desired results. Section 2 summarizes the case law and efforts
by the executive and legislative branches to modify the doctrine. Because of the
close relationship between the act of state and political question doctrines [30],
section 3 applies political question analysis to touchstone act of state decisions,
comparing their reasoning with that suggested by the Supreme Court in
Sabbatino. The article focuses on several recent cases: Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co.
[31], as an example of the classical approach; Dunhill [32], as an example of
functional balancing; and the companion cases of Timberlane [33] and JAM v.
OPEC [34], both by Judge Choy of the Ninth Circuit, as examples of
prudential balancing. Section 4, the conclusion, discusses the implications of
the doctrine's current status.

2. Background
2.1. Case law perspective
The seminal decision in act of state jurisprudence is Sabbatino [35], in which
the Court faced one of a number of cases arising out of the Cuban government's
expropriation of property in 1960. In Sabbatino,sugar sold under contract to a
U.S. company was expropriated before being shipped to the United States. The
sugar was ultimately shipped after the U.S. broker entered into new contracts
identical with those already made. The broker, however, refused to pay on this
second contract because he claimed he was also liable under the first, pre-expropriation contract. The Cuban government, through its representative bank,
sued and, after judgment against it in the district [36] and circuit [37] courts,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judgment in favor of the defendants abused the act of state doctrine, which precluded judicial examination of
the validity of expropriation, even if allegedly in violation of international law
[38].
The logic of international comity is often distinguished [39], as Justice
Harlan did in his majority opinion in Sabbatino [40], from that underlying the
concept of separation of powers. Justice Harlan found that the act of state
doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government
in a system of separation of powers". On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist's
plurality opinion in Citibank [41] asserted that the act of state doctrine "has its
roots, not in the Constitution, but in the notion of comity between independent sovereigns". This appears to be an important distinction, but is little more
than a tactical one.
In Citibank, the emphasis on "comity" and the de-emphasis of "separation
of powers" allowed Justice Rehnquist to affirm the view that deference to
recommendations from the executive branch does not damage the Court's
constitutional integrity [42]. In Sabbatino, the emphasis on separation of
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powers allowed Justice Harlan to assert the federal nature of the question in
order to clarify that claims resulting from expropriation could not be resolved
under state law. Justice Harlan's analysis demonstrates how separation of
power arguments serve a court that desires to abstain. "[W]hatever way the
matter is cut, the possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive
Branches could hardly be avoided" [43]. And, "[i]f the political branches are
unwilling to exercise their ample powers to effect compensation, this reflects a
judgment of the national interest which the judiciary would be ill-advised to
undermine indirectly" [44].
It is important to understand that a relationship exists between the theories
of comity and separation of powers which inform the act of state doctrine [45].
A recapitulation of five earlier cases will help. In The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, the Court described the question as one of "the perfect equality
and absolute independence of sovereigns, and [the] common interest impelling
them to mutual intercourse..." [46]. In Underhill v. Hernandez, the Court
found that the relationship between independent states required that "the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory" [47]. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.
expressed concepts of sovereignty and of separation of powers:
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned
in the courts of another ...[must] rest ...upon the highest considerations of international comity
and expediency... [48].
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative - "the political" - Departments of the Government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision [49],

Ricaud v. American Metal Co. presents the comity principle in terms of
conflicts of law doctrine, holding that the act of state doctrine
does not deprive the courts of jurisdictionA once acquired over a case. It requires only that, when
it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on the subject-matter of
the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be
accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision. 50

Sabbatino confirms the doctrine's roots in the separation of powers:
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in"
a system of separation of
powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular
kinds of decisions in the area of international relations [51].
Its continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government ...[52].
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Rather than reflecting a progressively changing doctrine [53], taken together
these cases represent a common view of the role of judicial power and those
responsible for using it. The principles of comity and separation of powers can
be reconciled by recognizing that both describe a system of government and
law which depends upon a balanced relationship between autonomous and
equal "political" partners, each drawing strength and credibility from acts of
mutual recognition and deference. This view similarly underlies discussions of
conflicts of law, institutional competency, and the relationship between
sovereign states.
The formulations of the act of state doctrine in The Schooner Exchange and
in Underhill, although couched in the language of comity, share with Sabbatino
a commitment to the central federalist premise that the state should be
concerned with the distribution of power among those political entities responsible for using it [54]. Thus, in Underhill,the principles of federalism focus
on the distribution of power among nation-states. The principles remain
familiar domestic ones, although expressed in an international context, and
include notions of the comity and fairness due legitimate powers [55] and ideas
found in traditional choice of law rules [56].
While deftly consolidating a century of case law, the Sabbatino opinion
opened the door for balancing approaches. Although Justice Harlan affirmed
that the act of state doctrine depends on "the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs" [57], he continued in a more flexible vein, suggesting that
the doctrine might allow courts to respond more pragmatically to economic
realities.
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it. since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international justice.... The balance of relevant considerations
may also be shifted.... Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and
all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ... in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlhng legal principles... [581.

Although this language may only reflect a compromise written to gain support
and limited to the facts at issue, it has become the foundation for balancing
tests [591.
The purpose of this paragraph is unclear unless it is seen in context, with
emphasis on the right words. Only the most self-evident and unambiguous
codification of international law would seem to satisfy Justice Harlan's test, for
he indicates that absent unambiguous international law the credibility of
executive branch diplomacy [60] and the credibility of the courts are at risk
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[61]. The evolution of uniform principles of international law is equally
jeopardized [62]. He perceived inconsistencies between the requirements of
diplomacy and the piecemeal, inflexible nature of litigation [63]. He foresaw a
threat to the U.S. marketplace when importers could expect title challenges,
especially in expropriation controversies [64], and predicted a universal suspicion when courts of "the world's major capital exporting country and principal
exponent of the free enterprise system" [65] impose standards on nations with
different economic and political goals. Nonetheless, significant pluralities of
the Supreme Court [66] and lower court judges have embraced the "Sabbatino
balancing test" [671. In doing so, some judges have been persuaded that weight
should be given to executive and legislative suggestions.
Courts have thus been willing to adopt positions taken by the executive
branch towards act of state claims. In Dunhill [68], for example, a plurality
took solace [69] in the fact that the executive branch supported [70] its denial
of sovereign status to the "commercial" acts of the Cuban government. In fact,
the Court suggested that executive branch support should guide [71], if not
compel, its decisions in act of state questions [72]. Courts react similarly to
legislative hints, especially where state acts may be characterized as commercial. Thus, after Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
[73], which incorporated a theory of restrictive sovereign immunity [741 in its
definition of federal jurisdiction, some courts began to treat the FSIA as
though it modified or even superseded the act of state doctrine [75].
2.2. Executive and legislative involvement
Executive branch involvement has been a force in defining act of state
questions. Some commentators have argued [76] that yielding to the recommendations of the executive branch is itself an affirmation of the doctrine of
the separation of powers since the courts defer to the executive branch when
they yield. Others [77] contend that application of the doctrine requires
guidance from the political branches, but then only when articulated in
legislation directed to "categories of disputes rather than in discrete cases" [78]
so judicial deference can be balanced by judicial independence.
2.2.1. Yielding to the executive branch
The modern rationale for yielding to recommendations from the executive
branch is found in the Bernstein litigation [79], in which a Jewish immigrant
claimed property that had been taken from him through Nazi torture and
imprisonment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held itself bound by the
principles of the act of state doctrine and declined to adjudicate Bernstein's
claim, indicating that the competent political branch had not yet acted to
relieve the courts from restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction [80]. The
State Department then published a letter purporting to "relieve American
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courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the acts of Nazi officials". In response, the same court reversed
its position and denied an act of state defense in a related case [81]. Though a
majority of the Supreme Court has never approved the Bernstein Exception
and six justices specifically rejected it in Citibank [82], the Bernstein Exception
has retained a certain degree of vitality. In Dunhill, for example, the plurality
used State Department letters to support its view that denying act of state
protection to the Cuban government would not embarrass the executive branch
[83]. The Court even suggested that, on the contrary, applying the doctrine in a
"purely commercial" context might embarrass the executive branch [84].
Such judicial deference hardly reconfirms the principles of separation of
powers. Indeed, such deference mistakes the nature of the act of state doctrine.
Deference as a principle of separation of powers requires that the judiciary
remain silent when the political branches should act. It does not mean that the
judiciary should obey "political recommendation", for, as Justice Powell
noted, "... even in cases deemed to involve purely political acts, it is the duty
of the judiciary to decide for itself whether deference to the political branches
of Government requires abstention" [85].
As Justice Douglas observed, under the Bernstein Exception the judiciary
appears to invite political branches to treat it as a "mere errand boy for the
Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the
fire, but not others" [86]. Clearly, deference of this kind obviates a doctrine
meant to insulate the courts and renders them vulnerable to legislative and
executive pressures.
2.2.2. Yielding to the legislative branch
The federal courts have been mixed in their reactions to congressional
messages. In swift reaction to Sabbatino, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 [87]. The amendment was
intended to limit the freedom of courts to apply the act of state doctrine where
an expropriation occurred in violation of international principles [88] regarding
compensation for property [89]. The courts have refused, however, to apply the
amendment to assets not brought into the United States [90]; to offsetting
claims [91]; to oil concessions [92]; and to defenses of sovereign immunity [93].
The fact that the Hickenlooper Amendment did not seriously alter the impact
of the act of state doctrine may support a view that the doctrine withstands
legislative manipulation.
In contrast, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 [94] has
had a more extensive impact on the doctrine. The FSIA was enacted to extend
the jurisdiction of the federal courts over a variety of cases involving foreign
states [95], in particular those in which the foreign state engaged in commercial
activities [96]. The FSIA basically incorporates principles reflected in the
plurality opinion in Dunhill which had previously been embraced by the State
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Department in the "Tate letter" of 1952 [97]. While the FSIA does not bear
directly on the act of state doctrine, some courts have been persuaded that it
altered the doctrine by incorporating principles of restrictive sovereign immunity [98]. Others have held [99] that questions of jurisdiction and justiciability
are unrelated and that Congress -made no connection between the two [100].
For the latter group, sovereign immunity remains a principle of international
law, and the act of state doctrine remains a strictly domestic legal principle
arising from the peculiar role of U.S. courts [101]. They perceive that sovereign
immunity defines the scope of a court's jurisdiction, while act of state doctrine
responds to the different question of justiciability [102]. Under the act of state
doctrine, a court does not inquire into the state's purpose in acting [103], while
under the FSIA the "nature of the act" test embodied in the commercial
activity exception makes the state's purpose relevant [104].

3. Three models of the act of state doctrine
3.1. Overview
The logic and the heritage of the act of state doctrine are linked with those
of the political question doctrine [105]. Despite debate [106], it is not settled
that the two doctrines spring from the same constitutional source [107], require
the same analysis [108], or whether either doctrine is mandated by the
Constitution or merely discretionary [109]. Both doctrines, however, clearly
draw strength from the constitutional principles underlying the three-branch
structure of the U.S. government [1101.
Both doctrines depend on the ability of the courts [111] to adjust the
boundaries separating the three branches when such adjustments are necessary
to maintain a balance among equals. Consequently, the judiciary's duty is to
set limits for itself as well as for the political branches [112]. These boundaries
are by no means fixed and immutable; they cannot be since they express
relative values. They may be viewed as a form of political and institutional
physics: for every action, there is an opposite and equal reaction.
The reactive quality of this application of constitutional principles is most
evident in political question and act of state cases. Judicial power can be
limited through abstentions and declarations of nonjusticiability. Although
reluctant to employ them, courts are unwilling to dispense with these powers
[113], especially when the legislative or executive branch attempts to restrict or
compromise their use. Thus, in the aftermath of the Hickenlooper Amendment,
the courts preserved the act of state doctrine by construing the amendment
narrowly. Sabbatinoitself may exemplify judicial reassertion and extension of a
doctrine as a reaction to executive branch efforts to subject the judiciary to its
political position on foreign policy [114].
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Disagreement about the nature of the political question doctrine has exposed at least three rationales [1151, the classical, functional, and prudential
approaches, which provide a useful framework for act of state questions as
well. This article redefines the categories, accounting for the differences which
arise in applying political question doctrine to cases that implicate both the
"vertical" federal legal structure and the "horizontal" international legal
structure [116]. These approaches reveal differing assumptions about the role
of the judiciary in a federal system. Most importantly, identification of the
approaches reveals how courts - depending upon the questions raised manipulate doctrine to achieve certain results.
The classical approach restricts each court to a careful appraisal of its
competency to resolve the dispute, both as one component of a federal system
and as a domestic court in an international legal order. In contrast, the
balancing tests of the functional and prudential approaches demonstrate a
court's faith in its ability to balance a variety of individual, national and
foreign interests.
3.Z The classicalmodel
Domestically, in the arena reserved for political questions, the classical
model presumes that courts will abstain only given "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"
[117], as the courts interpret the constitutionally imposed boundaries of each
branch [118]. Under the classical model, the burden is to show that the
Constitution precludes adjudication of the issue. In act of state questions, the
classical model reverses the presumption and shifts the burden without changing its underlying logic. As the cases from Underhill to Sabbatino make clear,
the presumption is that courts should not adjudicate issues that implicate the
acts of foreign powers [119]. Instead, they must show why these issues should
be judged.
The classical model is consistent across its domestic and international
versions. On domestic questions, the Constitution establishes the competence
of the courts to define the roles of the coordinate branches of government;
therefore the courts must articulate their constitutional reasons for deferring to
another branch. A similar presumption of judicial competence in the area of
international law does not exist. In fact, because there is neither an "adequate
'higher law' available to resolve serious disputes between states", nor a legal
structure "effective to overcome most conflicts that arise within it" [1201, the
opposite is true and something more is required to demonstrate competence.
The classical act of state doctrine recognizes that international disputes
often involve questions beyond the competence of the courts because these
disputes force courts to evaluate the acts of foreign states and to make and
implement decisions affecting these states [121]. Furthermore, when confronted
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by questions not based upon "a treaty or other unambiguous agreement" [122]
or clearly defined international standard [123], courts must apply different
standards which go beyond those that "... govern the interpretive process
generally" [124] and beyond their powers to interpret a constitutional text.
Their dilemma is compounded because the constitutionally founded values,
both social and economic, that are applicable to domestic disputes are not
necessarily transferable to the international environment [125].
The classical model has, as a logical concomitant, little sympathy for the
equities involved between the parties. From the outset its goal is to preserve the
structural integrity of the domestic and international political systems, not to
provide remedies or impose sanctions [126]. This approach results in broad
immunity to private defendants who involve a foreign government in their
anticompetitive schemes and offers scant redress for plaintiffs [1271.
In Hunt, for example, this immunity was soundly criticized by courts and
commentators alike [128]. The criticism, however, reflects a reordering of the
priorities found in Sabbatino. The opinion in Sabbatino quite explicitly subordinated the question of individual equities to the issue of institutional
integrity. It stressed the difficulties created when a court attempts to weigh
divergent economic and ideological national interests [129] or when it responds
on an ad hoc basis [130] to private interests or to the equities between parties
[131].
3.2.1. Classical examples
The Hunt plaintiff [132] claimed that oil producers had conspired to
preserve their competitive advantage at his expense. He contended that fellow
oil producers had persuaded him to join in a "sharing agreement" that
"guaranteed" him backup oil if he took a tough bargaining position with the
Libyan government. When the Libyan government began negotiations, Hunt
stood firm and, as a result, his oil property was nationalized [133].
Perhaps to circumvent an act of state defense, Hunt did not challenge the
validity of the Libyan nationalization [134]. He claimed that Libya's act was
induced by the unlawful conduct of the defendants [135] but failed to persuade
the court [136]. The Second Circuit held that, under the Sherman Act, Libyan
nationalization was a necessary element of the charge, since Hunt had to
establish that the injury was a direct result of the conspiracy [137]. It reasoned
that such proof was not possible unless Hunt could show that "but for" the
conspiracy "Libya would not have moved against it" [138].
The Hunt opinion invoked the act of state doctrine in the language of
Sabbatino: the doctrine "precludes the courts.. .from inquiring into the validity" of sovereign acts [139]. Using a classical analysis, the court concluded that
inquiry into the validity of the Libyan nationalization was best left to the
executive branch [140]. The court noted both its lack of the requisite expertise
in foreign affairs to render an appropriate decision on "an issue of far-reaching
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national concern" [141] and its procedural inability to probe "the subtle and
delicate issue of the policy of a foreign sovereign, a Serbonian Bog..." [142].
Its application of the act of state doctrine was somewhat mechanical, but
Hunt expressed the correct decision. Hunt's argument rested on his ability to
show that the "sharing agreement" triggered the nationalization of his property and assumed that Libya had no other motive for its action - an
assumption that the court was powerless to test. In contrast to Hunt's claims,
the governmental conduct in question was part of "a continuing and broadened confrontation between the East and West in an oil crisis which has
implications and complications far transcending those suggested by appellants"
[143]. It was therefore reasonable for the court to conclude that the expropriation was part of a series of political reprisals directed at the United States
rather than an act meant to punish one intransigent oil producer [144]. In these
circumstances, to balance U.S. interests against Libyan interests, or the interests of Hunt against those of his fellow oil producers, would have been naive
and over-reaching. Such balancing would have assumed competence equal to
that of the State Department, which the court declined to assert.
The court's argument in Hunt is straightforward, yet its elegance does betray
the rigid nature of the contemporary classical model and suggests why most
courts have been unwilling to follow it [145]. The opinion is uncompromising
in its attitude towards the equities of the private parties and the relative
economic interests of the United States and Libya [146]. Its rigidity, however,
may partially result from judicial pique at the frustrating disarray in the
doctrine: "it is not for this inferior court to undertaken the task [of defining
the act of state]. This is particularly so since our holding is compelled by the
separation of powers underpinning of the doctrine" [147].
Although the classical model has fallen into disfavor [148], it has retained
vitality when the foreign state's economic interests are seen to involve its
strategic or natural resources [149], or when the national interests at stake are
particularly sensitive [150]. In these cases, courts continue with a structured
analysis directed to their competence and explain their abstentions by invoking
the principles of international comity [151] or the deference required by
federalism [152].
3.3. Balancing: Functionaland prudentialmodels
Sabbatino'sexplanation of the act of state doctrine as ajudicial extension of
principles embodied in a system with separate powers [153] limits the act of
state analysis to an evaluation of the institutional roles at risk. Does the federal
system provide an effective and preferred method for resolving the conflict
without recourse to the courts [154]? Given the precedential weight of judicial
decisions, even a "just" decision acceptable to the world community may
damage the relationships between the branches [155]. Would adjudication by a
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domestic court, even if internally justified, threaten the growth of a world
order of law? Given the impulse of domestic systems to extend legal control
beyond national boundaries [156], the conflict between different ideologies
[157] may sharpen unless federal courts employ self-restraint based upon a
healthy respect for the independence of foreign states and a due regard for
judicial autonomy [158].
The Sabbatino viewpoint of the act of state doctrine "concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of
decisions in the area of international relations" [159] and calls attention to the
constraints imposed upon each branch by its specialized functions. In this
light, courts should be unconcerned with the specific foreign policy issues
raised [160], the policy "signals" from the political branches, or the specific
injuries suffered by the claimants [161], and should focus instead on the
potential for injury to the federal system, the risks to the credibility of U.S.
law, and the potential for disrupting the judicial process by using it to set
standards of international law [162].
This reading of Justice Harlan's language is not, however, self-evident [163].
On the contrary, courts and commentators interpret the Sabbatino opinion as
the Supreme Court's endorsement of a more active role for the judiciary in
disputes that involve foreign sovereigns. The opinion is seen as outlining the
rudimentary principles of a balancing test that permits courts to weigh the
"injury to our foreign policy against the injury to the private party, who is
denied justice...", or against "a consequent injury to international trade"
[164]. Such balancing alters the judicial perspective [165]. Instead of addressing
the institutional issues, courts adopting a form of balancing treat the dispute as
though it were a purely domestic suit controlled by domestic principles of law
[166].
The result of balancing is to recast language in the Sabbatino opinion to
emphasize the individual judge's competence to resolve the dispute over the
competence of the judicial branch to adjudicate "foreign" issues [167]. This is
because two propositions pervade balancing opinions: that if jurisdiction is
present, the court should adjudicate absent a compelling reason to abstain; and
that a court can resolve most disputes placed before it, even those involving the
acts of a foreign state. The central problem thus becomes not whether the court
should act, but how it should act; not whether it is overstepping boundaries,
but whether it will be criticized for doing so [168]. As a consequence, such
courts are concerned whether their judgments will be positively perceived and
effectively enforced. Balancing courts resolve these issues differently.
3.3.1. The functional approach
Some judges, such as those in the Dunhill plurality, approach the problem
pragmatically. By yielding to the views of the political branches, they display
respect for the other branches of government. By concentrating on the nature
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of the private injury and the reasonable expectations of the parties as demonstrated in the course of conduct, and by emphasizing the equitable relief
available in support of a judgment, they stress their equitable powers. They
limit themselves to considering whether they are sufficiently informed about
the "official" U.S. position to avoid conflict with or embarrassment of the
executive branch [169] or to escape contradicting legislative intent [170];
whether they have available judicially manageable standards [171] or relevant
data on the issues raised [172]; or whether the injury claimed is such that
justice and fairness demand a judicial remedy [173]. In short, this approach
limits the range of questions by stressing the court's ability "to manage" a
case; to discover the relevant facts, treating the representations of the executive
branch as "facts"; and to test the equitable interests of the litigants by
characterizing them as private citizens without a colorable hint of state
involvement. The result reasserts the power of the judiciary and its ability to
function with procedural competence.
3.3.2. Functionalexample
An example is Dunhill [174], in which the petitioners claimed that the Cuban
government had refused to return funds owed them [175]. The Cuban government claimed that such refusal was an act of state immune from judgment in a
U.S. court. The petitioners argued that the defense should not apply because
the act was purely commercial [176]. The U.S. government's amicus brief
proposed that the Court go further - overrule Sabbatino and abandon the act
of state doctrine or fashion a broad commercial act exception to the doctrine
[177]. A majority of the Court [178] could agree only that the Cuban government had not proved it had acted in its state capacity [179]. Justice White
gained only plurality support for the broader proposition that a sovereign's
commercial acts constitute exceptions to the act of state doctrine [180].
Justice White, the sole dissenter in Sabbatino, had three premises in Dunhill.
Each promoted a functional analysis. (1) In foreign policy matters and act of
state claims, the judiciary should defer, if possible, to the expertise of the
executive branch [181]. (2) Even in act of state cases, the equitable interests of
private trading partners demand recognition [182]. (3) A state act is one which
the state has formally ratified [183]. Each premise narrows the analysis, for the
appropriateness of the claim is left largely to another branch of government,
the claim is made subject to the interests represented by the parties, and the
factors establishing state action are drastically reduced.
By invoking the State Department's support for a commercial act exception,
Justice White aligned the judiciary with the political branches in a way the
Sabbatino Court had not envisioned. For him, "the major underpinning of act
of state doctrine" [184] was not the constitutional relationship between branches
and the competency of dissimilar institutions [185], but "the policy of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their
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own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the
conduct of our foreign relations" [186]. Justice White evidently read the
separation of powers language in Sabbatino as intended to protect the credibility of the political branches [187]. The passage may be read equally, however,
as an affirmation of judicial autonomy [188].
By deciding that the principle of equity was "required" in commercial and
contract disputes [189], Justice White narrowed the court's inquiry to the
parties' conduct and the potential injury to U.S. foreign policy:
...The proper application ...[of the act of state doctrine) ...involves a balancing of the
injury to our foreign policy ...against the injury to the private party, who is denied
justice.... In the commercial area the need for merchants to have their rights determined in
courts outweighs any injury to foreign policy [1901.

This analysis depends upon the premise that it is unfair to bar litigation when
the parties expected to do business by reasonable standards of commerce.
Justice White's reliance on equitable principles is misplaced, however, given
the institutional rationale of the act of state doctrine [191]. As Justice Marshall,
writing for the dissent, explained, "...the act of state doctrine exempts no one
from the process of the court.... [The doctrine] merely tells a court what law to
apply to a case; it 'concerns the limits for determining the validity of an
otherwise applicable rule of law"' [192].
Although Justice White was unable to muster a majority of the Court for a
broad commercial activity exception [234], he succeeded in creating a narrow
test for determining the indicia of an "act of state": evidence of formal
endorsement, whether by statute, order, or equivalent affirmative action [193].
Here the tactical advantages of the functional approach become apparent.
Controversies are decided on limited grounds with close scrutiny directed to
the burdens of prooL Thus, in determining whether the Cuban government had
met its burden, Justice White could find neither facts on the record [194] nor a
formal act by the Cuban government [195] to establish that its refusal to return
the monies was a state act. Such scrutiny limits the doctrine and provides a
useful tool for the denial of act of state defenses.
3.3.3. The prudential approach
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the various forms of balancing tests
used by courts. Thus, although functional and prudential balancing have been
used for different purposes and to achieve different ends, they are often
melded. For example, in Timberlane [196] the court predeated much of its
analysis on prudential reasoning while finding additional functional grounds
on which to reject the act of state claim: some of the acts upon which the claim
was based lacked allegations of a relationship to the state [197]. In contrast, the
court's prudential analysis revealed the broader questions raised by courts,
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inquiries directed to assessing the nature of a state's interest.
Prudential courts, in common with functional courts, appreciate the pragmatic realities of power, especially their own [198]. These courts, however, are
more cautious [199], perhaps due to their uneasiness with assessing a foreign
sovereign's interests. For this reason, under a prudential approach, a court is as
likely to reject an act of state claim to preserve its authority as to accept a
claim to keep from undermining judicial credibility [2001. Considerations of
equity are less crucial to prudential judges. They begin by accepting the
potential validity of foreign acts of state [201] but are not satisfied until the
foreign sovereign's public interest is evaluated [202] and then weighed against
U.S. interests [203]. The language of prudential opinions thus discusses broad
goals of national policy [204].
The process of comparing foreign interests and U.S. interests is highly
subjective and often slanted in favor of U.S. interests because U.S. courts view
the significance of domestic laws and U.S. regulatory goals more favorably
than foreign ones. For example, the U.S. antitrust laws may be considered
more "significant" than a foreign state's interests in its own affairs. The effects
test, the legacy of the Alcoa case, survives: a "state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends" [205]. Thus, in
recent antitrust actions, the U.S. policy interests embodied in antitrust laws
have been found more important than a foreign state's interest in its patent law
[206], its licensing procedures [2071, its judicial system [208], its state-owned
enterprises [209], and its method for purchasing military equipment [210]. In
balancing, U.S. antitrust interests thus overrode foreign interests except when
the foreign interest was explicitly strategic [211] or the foreign state was viewed
as politically significant [212].
3.3.4. Prudentialexample
The defendant in Timberlane [213] was accused of conspiratorial activities
involving the abuse of the judicial proceedings of Honduras and bribery of a
court officer [214]. The lower court dismissed the case under the act of state
doctrine [215], but Judge Choy, writing for the Ninth Circuit, vacated the
judgment [216].
After a careful discussion of the act of state doctrine, citing elements from
the three models identified in this article, Judge Choy turned to Sabbatino's
commendation of the "balance of relevant considerations" [217]. He determined that the relevant consideration was the "depth and nature" of the
state's interest in the act, not merely the validity of the act [218]. The test was
viewed as an inquiry into the significance of the public purpose: has the state
engaged in an act in order to achieve some goal or is it merely the vehicle
through which private citizens act towards private goals [219]? This analysis
thus distinguishes between recognizing an act as the expression of a state [220]
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and reducing a transaction to the specific facts in dispute [221].
Judge Choy concluded that the suit did not threaten "relations between
Honduras and the United States" [222], and that "there is no indication that
the actions of the Honduran court and authorities reflected a sovereign
decision that Timberlane's efforts should be crippled or trade with the United
States should be restrained" [223]. These conclusions rested partially on his
determination that the Honduran court was a disinterested judicial forum
which had been exploited by the defendant.
Testing for state interest is deceptive, however. As one commentator observed about the Timberlane conclusion, "it seems difficult to imagine a case
with more potential to offend a foreign government and to embarrass our own
than an American court's declaring a foreign government's decision invalid
because inadequately reasoned, inconsistent with its own law, or induced by
the corruption or bribery of a foreign judge or official..." [224]. The same
difficulties arise when a U.S. court attempts to measure the interest of the state
in its patent system [225] or its procedures for licensing its natural resources
[226]. By distinguishing between "the validity" of an act and "the interest" a
state has in the act itself, Judge Choy follows the Dunhill [227] plurality's
requirement of evidence of formal ratification to endow the act with sovereign
purpose. This "rule" may be suspect in Dunhill,and is more so in Timberlane,
where a test for formal ratification is used, by implication, to evaluate the
state's interest in its judicial process.
In OPEC [228], Judge Choy clarified his views on the act of state doctrine.
An American union accused the members of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) of violating U.S. antitrust laws by fixing oil
prices [229]. The court held that the act of state doctrine supported dismissal,
reasoning that the doctrine was fashioned to fit such cases [230]: to proceed
would have required the federal court to apply domestic antitrust doctrine to,
and judge the purpose behind, the acts of the OPEC nations [231]. According
to Judge Choy, a court cannot judge the underlying purposes of a foreign state
without presuming too much [232], especially when the challenged act involves
a strategic national resource [2331.
Few opinions present so candidly the judicial doubts and "inner vulnerability" [234] underlying the prudential approach to act of state jurisprudence.
Judge Choy sees the judiciary as unable to evaluate "competing economic and
political considerations" [235] because of the random fashion in which cases
are presented for decision [236]. Prudential courts betray anxiety, as Professor
Bickel wrote, "not so much that judicial judgment will be ignored, as that
perhaps it should be but won't..." [237].
OPEC and Timberlane together demonstrate that the prudential approach
"balances" interests based upon rough estimates of policy and national
interests. In Timberlane, no real Honduran interest was found in the integrity
of its courts. In OPEC, however, the OPEC nations' interest in their oil
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appeared all but self-evident. The analysis seems conclusory. Once satisfied
with the significance of the interest [238], the court in OPEC accepted the act
of state claim using an explanation drawn from the classical model; a finding
for the plaintiffs "would in effect amount to an order from a domestic court"
to a foreign sovereign [239]. Conversely, a holding for the OPEC countries
would constitute judicial endorsement of their acts and hamper the executive
branch in diplomatic negotiations [240]. Here resurface the Sabbatino and
Underhill principles of domestic federalism and comity [241].
While the Timberlane decision blends prudential and functional analysis,
the OPECdecision combines prudential and classical analysis. Although Judge
Choy himself classified the act of state doctrine as "a prudential doctrine
designed to avoid judicial action in sensitive areas" [242], his opinion is hostile
to arguments that "the FSIA supersedes the act of state doctrine or that the
amorphous doctrine is limited by modern jurisprudence" [243]. Like Judge
Mulligan in Hunt [244], Judge Choy refused to dilute or distort the doctrine
with exceptions [245] or to heed the legislative messages which would undermine his judicial function [246].
3.3.5. In sum
Balancing approaches give courts an activist role in consolidating and
integrating economic values through their decisions, even where international
consensus is absent [247]. They place responsibility on domestic courts for
harmonizing conflicting international law. In Sabbatino, Justice Harlan expressed his disapproval of such a role for the courts:
[W]e find respondents' ... arguments quite unpersuasive ...that United States courts
could make a significant contribution to the growth of international law.... [Gliven the
fluidity of present world conditions, the effectiveness of such a patchwork approach toward
the formulation of an acceptable body of law concerning state responsibility for expropriations is, to say the least, highly conjectural [2481.

Balancing approaches lead to equally unfortunate results, including a highly
subjective body of case law and an ad hoc evolution of policy that is dependent
on standards developed specifically for each case and is responsive primarily to
the interests of the parties in dispute [249].

4. Conclusion
This article has examined how U.S. courts, since Sabbatino, have treated the
act of state doctrine. A doctrine that once seemed all but definitive is now
tortured by twists of judicial logic and seems highly subjective in its application. Courts have become less interested in the allocation of judicial respon-
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sibility in the domestic and international settings and more engrossed in the
tactics of maintaining judicial credibility once they enter areas previously
reserved for international law or executive branch diplomacy.
In the process, the meaning of deference has been altered. Originally a
judicial judgment that a dispute could best be handled by another branch of
government [250], the term now justifies obedience to preliminary signals from
the political branches. As a result, an admixture of judicial passivity and
activism is apparent. Courts are "mere errand boy[s]" [251] for the executive
and legislative branches yet concurrently adjudicate cases involving foreign
states and economic interests which would have called for abstention under the
classical act of state doctrine.
The judiciary has thus undertaken difficult questions of definition: when
has a foreign state demonstrated a recognizable interest in the outcome of the
litigation [252]? Should a plaintiff with a just claim be barred because he was
injured by a state or individual who claims protection under the act of state
doctrine [253]? Should the state receive protection when it has acted as a
private entrepreneur engaged in commercial transactions [254]? In a word
economy, how far should one nation's sanctions reach [255]? Can a domestic
court behave disinterestedly when applying domestic law to international
questions [256]? Are there sufficient restraints on its judgments [2573?
The danger of judicial activism is most evident in antitrust cases where
courts assert free market economic values to the disadvantage of nations with
managed or Third World economies. Courts generalize from U.S. antitrust
theory, rendering balancing tests disingenuous since the values are arrived at
through economic assumptions developed to regulate the U.S. market [258].
U.S. courts are equally ill-prepared to evaluate the interests of foreign states as
manifested through unfamiliar procedures and institutions. The economic and
political expansionism inherent in this judicial activism is no less imperial than
similar behavior from the political branches of government. Such judicial
activism also circumvents bilateral or multilateral negotiation and disrupts the
international system of treaties and agreements [259].
The effect of this new activist emphasis on the act of state doctrine can be
more readily described than explained. Perhaps the courts are unwilling "to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given" [2601. Perhaps the change
reflects an uneasy consensus within the three branches that U.S. laws are too
easily manipulated by private and state entrepreneurs who find safe harbor
through act of state immunity [2611. The impulse towards equitable resolution
of unprotected interests may explain one pressure on the doctrine: a society
based on laws may be unwilling to concede the notion that its domestic courts
cannot satisfy such appeals to justice. The result, however, alters the relationship of the branches and damages the development of international principles
acceptable to widely different ideological and economic systems.
Courts should return to the principles articulated in Sabbatizo. They should
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recognize the proper purpose of the act of state doctrine: to shield the judiciary
from legislative and executive pressures intended to usurp judicial autonomy.
Courts should remain sensitive to their dual roles as domestic courts maintaining the integrity of a federal system of government and as courts within one
nation interacting with an international legal system. For this reason, disputes
which can or should be resolved by other branches should not be adjudicated;
nor should cases be judged when unambiguous international legal principles
are lacking.
The need for the act of state doctrine remains compelling. Even given
jurisdiction, courts must continue to ask the central question of justiciability
essential to institutional integrity: whether ends more nearly constitutional will
be served by not acting.
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Rev. 805, 822 (1964); L. Henkin Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. 60 (1972) ("the Court [in
Sabbatino] went to lengths to seek novel constitutional doctrine and reestablish Act of State not as
national policy promulgated by the Executive but as law created by the federal courts on their own
authority."). See generally Note, Judicial Balancing, supra note 11, at 348-51. See also infra note
114 and accompanying text.
[29] The Dunhill Court faced the act of state question, but Justice White, the sole dissenter in
Sabbatino, was only able to persuade a plurality of the court to restrict the scope of the Sabbatino
opinion.
(30] See Citibank.406 U.S. at 788 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Sabbatino
analysis of act of state as being equivalent to political question analysis), cited with approval in
Dunhill, 525 U.S. at 727 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun, J.J.); OPEC.
649 F.2d at 1358-59. See also Comment, CommercialActivity, supra note 13. at 223. But see Note.
Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis. 51
Fordham L.Rev. 722 (1983) (distinguishing act of state doctrine from political question doctrine)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Political Question].
[31] Hunt, supra note 3.
[32] Dunhill,supra note 2.
[33] 7mberlane, supra note 8.
[34] OPEC,supra note 2.
[351 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (Harlan, J., for eight justices) (White, J., dissenting).
[361 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
[37] 307 F. 2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1962).
(381 376 U.S. at 428.
[39] But see JudicialBalancing,supra note 11, at 341-42 (suggesting that comity and separation
of power rationales are closely related because due deference to comity reinforces the power of the
executive branch and restrains the judiciary from intervening in foreign relations).
(40] 376 U.S. at 423.
(411 Citibank. 406 U.S. at 765.
[421 This position is known as the Bernstein Exception, arising from Bernstein v. N. .
Nederlandsche-AmertkaanscheStoomvaart-Maatschappij,210 F. 2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curial),
in which the Court of Appeals reversed an earlier decision upon being told by the State
Department that
[t]he policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United States for the
restitution of ... property ... lost through force, coercition, or duress as a result of Nazi
persecution ... , is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials.
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Press Release No. 196. Apr. 27, 1949, titled "Jurisdiction of United States Courts Re Suits for
Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers", reprintedin Bernstein, 210 F. 2d at 376.
The Bernstein Exception has had a fitful judicial history. In Sabbatino,Justice Harlan stated
that the Exception had never been accepted by the Court, 376 U.S. at 420. Despite the plurality's
approval in Citibank, six justices in concurrences and dissents rejected the Exception, 406 U.S. at
773 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 790-92 (Brennan, J..
dissenting, joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.). However, in Dunhill, again in a
plurality opinion and in the context of a recommendation from the State Department, Justice
White suggested that the State Department's views should be accorded some weight. See 425 U.S.
at 696-70 (plurality). But see id. at 724-25 (Marshall. J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart,
and Blackmun, J3..) (reasserting the Citibank rejection of the Bernstein Exception). See infra text
accompanying notes 79-86, discussing executive branch pressures on the judiciary.
[431 376 U.S. at 433.
[44] Id. at 436. As a response to Sabbatino, Congress enacted the Hiekenlooper Amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. §2370(e) (2) (1976). See infra text accompanying
notes 87-93. discussing the Hickenlooper Amendment.
[45] See generally, eg., J. Atwood and K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad,
238-41 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Atwood & Brewster, American Business Abroad]: Note,
PoliticalQuestion, supra note 30, at 722; Note, JudicialBalancing, supra note 11, at 327.
[46] 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (French warship claimed by a U.S. citizen while in U.S.
waters).
[47] 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (U.S. citizen claimed that he had been unlawfully detained by a
foreign military commander).
[48] 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918) (claim for restitution of hides seized by the Mexican military and
later sold to a U.S. dealer).
[49] Id. at 302.
[50] 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) (seeking recovery of lead bullion seized by the Mexican military
and later sold) (decided on the same day as Oetjen).
[51] 376 U.S. at 423.
[52] Id. at 427-28.
[53] But see, e.g., Note, Political Question, supra note 30. at 725-32 (citing each case for a
specific proposition to demonstrate that the underpinnings of the doctrine have evolved from
sovereignty principles to separation of powers).
[54] See id. at 427-28. See also Falk, Domestic Courts, supra note 12, at 27-31. 135-36.
[55] See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 762. See also Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 615 n. 34; Sage, 534 F.
Supp. at 898, 899.
[56] See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("[ihe general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.") See also Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 900.
[57] Sabbatino. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
[581 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
[59] See, e.g., Mannington Mills, 959 F. 2d at 1292-94; Inuestment Development Corp. (lID),
594 F. 2d at 55; Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 606; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 899; Atwood & Brewster,
American Business Abroad, supra note 45, at 240-41, 246-49. See also infra text accompanying
notes 153-249.
[60] See Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 431-33.
[61] Id. at 433-35.
[62] Id.
[63] Id. at 431-33; see OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1358 ("The courts, in contrast [to the political
branches] focus on single disputes and make decisions on the basis of legal principles.").
[64] See 376 U.S. at 433-34 and n. 39.
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[65] Id. at 434-35.
[66] See Citibank, 406 U.S. 459 (1972) (plurality opinion), Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 682.
[67] See. e.g., OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1359; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 905-06.
[68] See 425 U.S. at 695-716 (Part III of opinion, White, J.. joined by Burger. C.J.. and
Rehnquist, J.). Justice Powell, concurring, restated his position in Citibank,see 406 U.S. at 775-76.
that it remained "the duty of the judiciary to decide for itself whether deference to the political
branches ... requires abstention". Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715.
[69] See Leigh Letter. dated Nov. 26, 1975, reprintedin Dunhill,425 U.S. at 706-11 (Appendix
1); Tate Letter, dated May 19, 1952, reprintedin Dunhill. 425 U.S. at 711-15 (Appendix 2). for a
theory of restrictive sovereign immunity, which would deny immunity to sovereign powers engaged
in commercial activities.
[70] Id. at 696-98.
1711 ld. at 697-98.
[72] Id. at 705. See also Leigh Letter. id. at 709. The position of the Dunhill plurality was
consistent with its position in Citibank,406 U.S. at 768 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and
White, J.). which, by accepting the Bernstein Exception agreed that the judiciary should be guided
by the executive branch when an act of state claim was raised). See supra note 42.
[73] 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1976); see infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
[74] This position is known as restrictive sovereign immunity because it limits the freedom
from suit which sovereign governments traditionally received.
[75] See, e.g., Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 906-97; OutboardMarine, 461 F. Supp. at 398. But see
OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1359-60 (act of state is to be distinguished from the jurisdictional questions
raised by, and answered by, the FSIA).
[76] See, e.g., Note. PoliticalQuestion, supra note 30. at 731-32, discussing the Citibank Court's
use of the Bernstein Exception.
[77] See, e.g., Note. JudicialBalancing, supra note 11, at 351-53.
[781 Id. at 352.
[79] See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
[80] Bernstein v. Van Heyghen FriresSociktb Anonyine, 163 F. 2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
[81] Reprinted in Bernstein, 210 F. 2d at 376.
[82] 406 U.S. at 759. See also 425 U.S. at 724-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting" ... six members of
the Court in [Citibank] ... disapproved finally of the so-called Bernstein exception to the act of
state doctrine...").
[83] 425 U.S. at 697-98.
[841 Id.
[85] Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring).
[86] See Citibank,406 U.S. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
[871 22 U.S.C. §2370(e) (2) (1976).
1881 See 110 Cong. Rec. 19, 548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hickenlooper); see generally Note.
JudicialBalancing supra note 11, at 357-58.
[89]
... [No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any
party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking ... by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of compensation....
22 U.S.C. §2370(e) (2) (1976).
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190] See Entpresa Cubana Exportadora, Inc v. Lainborn &Co., 652 F. 2d 231, 237 (2d Cir.
1981).
[91] See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 759.
[92] See Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D.
La. 1975).
193] See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A. 2d 864
(1966).
[94] 28 U.S.c. §§1602-1611 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FSIA].
[95] Id. §1602.
[96] Id. §1605(a) (2). See also §1603(d) (A "commercial activity" means either a regular course
of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct of particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose).
[97] Reprinted in Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 711-15.
[98] See, ag., Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 907; Outboard Marine, 461 F. Supp. at 398.
[99] See, e.g., Empresa Cubana, 652 F. 2d at 238-39 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1981); OPEC, 649 F. 2d at
1359; Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 77-78; Allied Bank International, 566 F. Supp. at 1443.
[100] See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 n. 1 (1976). reprinted in [1976]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6619 n. 1 ("The Committee has found it unnecessary to address the
act of state doctrine in this legislation. Our courts already have considerable guidance enabling
them to reject improper assertions of the act of state doctrine."), cited in part in Empresa Cubana,
652 F. 2d at 238-39; OPEC 649 F. 2d at 1359; Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-57 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings]; Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the
Subcomm. on Claims & Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1973) (FSIA "in no way affects existing law concerning the extent to which the 'act of
state' doctrine may be applicable in similar circumstances"), cited in OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1359-60.
[101] OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1359.
[102] Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 74. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S.Ct. 1962,
1972-73 (1983) (holding that the FSIA is a grant of jurisdiction).
[103] See Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 77-79.
[104] See OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1357 n. 6.
[1051 See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 727 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Citibank, 406 U.S. at 788
(Brennan, J., dissenting); OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1358-59; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 906 n. 19 and
accompanying text. See also Tribe, Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 71-79, 76 n. 35; C. Wright,
Law of Federal Courts 52-56 (1976); Atwood & Brewster. American Business Abroad, supra note
45, at § 8.08 (2d. ed. pocket part 1981); Note, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to
International Cartels Involving Foreign Governments, 91 Yale L.J. 765, 783 n. 75 (1982). But see
Note, Political Question, supra note 30, at 730, 740, 742-43 (contending that the political question
doctrine and the act of state doctrine are distinct since the political question doctrine is
constitutionally mandated while application of the act of state doctrine is discretionary).
[106] See, e.g., Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 23-28, 69-71,172 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Dangerous Branch]; Tribe, Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 71-79, 71 n. 1, 76 n. 35;
Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 315-16 (1925); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Linitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 361 (1924), Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 Harv. i. Rev.
221, 229 (1925); Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, .73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
7-8, 9 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Neutral Principles]; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review.
Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1961); Bickel, 77e Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Forward:
The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40-45, 75 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bickel, Passive
Virtues]; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J.
517, 566-82, 596-97 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review]; Tigar, Judicial Power, The
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"Political Question" Doctrine and Foreign Relations. 17 UCLA L Rev. 1135 (1970): Note. The
Supreme Court, 1968 Terti, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7. 62 (1969-70): Henkin. Act of State Today:
Recollections in Tranquility. Colum. 1. Transnat'l L. 175. 179-81, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine? [hereinafter cited as Henkin, "Political Question" Doctrine]. 85 Yale L.J. 597. 600-06.
622-24 (1976); Note, Political Question. supra note 30. at 740.
[107] Cf. Sabbatno, 376 U.S. at 423-24 ("The text of the Constitution does not require the act
of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the
validity of foreign acts of state. The act of state doctrine does. however, have 'constitutional'
underpinnings") and Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186. 217 (1962) ("... questions arise [which] may
describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department...").
[108] See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 788 (Brennan. J., dissenting. joined by Stewart. Marshall. and
Blackmun. J.J.): accord Dunhill 425 U.S. at 726-28 (Marshall. J., dissenting, joined by Brennan.
Stewart. and Blackmun. JJ.).
[1091 Cf. Henkin. "Political Question" Doctrine supra note 106. and Note. Political Question.
supra note 30. See also Deroburt v. Gannet Co.. Inc.. 548 F. Supp. 1370. 1374 & n. 7 (D. Hawaii
1982).
[1101 See Yupra note 107. comparing Sabbatno with Baker.
[111] See Marbur.' ,. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 177-78 (1803) (it is the "duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is...").
[112] See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. quoted supra at note 107.
[113] See, e.g.. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264. 404 (1821) (Marshall. CJ.) ("It is most true.
that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true. that it must take
jurisdiction, if it should.... With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it. if it be brought before us.")
[114] See Henkin. The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino. 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 805, 822 (1964):
Perhaps the Court [in Sabbatino] was reluctant even to appear to be abdicating judicial
functions and accepting political direction from the executive branch. Perhaps it feared that
basing Act of State on the authority of the Executive would also subject the courts to ad hoc
determinations in the decision of particular cases which would make the courts appear as
the handmaiden of the State Department.
[115] See Tribe, Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 71 n. 1. Tribe identifies the three
approaches as classical, referring to Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 106. and to Weston.
PoliticalQuestions. supra note 106: as prudential, referring to Bickel. Dangerous Branch. supra note
106, and to Finkelstein. Judicial Self-Limitation. supra note 106: and as functional, referring to
Scharpf, Judicial Review. supra note 106.
[116] See Falk. Act of State. supra note 12 and accompanying text, at 4.
[1171 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
[1181 See Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 106, at 9 ("[T]he only proper judgment that
may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination
of the issue to another agency of government than the courts. ... [Wlhat is involved is in itself an
act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by standards that should govern the
interpretive process generally.").
[119] See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401 (the act of state doctrine "precludes the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized power committed within its
own territory"). See also Note. Judicial Balancing, supra note 11. at 353 (arguing for the
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presumption that courts should not adjudicate issues with foreign policy implications without
political branch permission).
[120] Falk, Act of State, supra note 12, at 4.
[121] Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
[122] Id. at 428.
[123] Id. at 430.
[124] Wechsler, NeutralPrinciples,supra note 106.
[125] Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430.
[126] Id. at 432-33, 435. See also OPEC,649 F. 2d at 1358. Compare this lack of concern for
private interests with the active concern for the interests of injured, private parties in Dunhill, see
infra text accompanying notes 174-195.
[127) See, e.g., discussion of Hunt infra accompanying notes 132-147.
[128] See Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F. 2d 300, 304 & n. 5 (3d Cir. 1982); lID, 594
F. 2d at 54-55; Note, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns[hereinafter cited
as Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction], 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1247 (1977); Note, The Act of State
Doctrine: Antitrust Conspiracies to Induce Foreign Sovereign Acts [hereinafter cited as Note,
Antitrust Conspiracies].10 NYU J. Int'l L. & Pol. 495 (1978).
[129) 376 U.S. at 430.
[130] Id. at 435-36.
[1311 Id. at 432.
[132] 550 F. 2d 68 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
[133] Id. at 70-72.
[134] Id. at 75-77.
[1351 Id. at 76, 68. Cf Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F. 2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)
(holding that the act of state defense applied in a similar case) [hereinafter cited as Buttes Gas].
[136] 550 F. 2d at 72.
[137] Id. at 76.
[1381 Id.
[139] Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 401, cited by Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 73. See also Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 77.
The Hunt court quoted Sabbatino through Dunhill,suggesting that the Dunhill plurality court had
"reaffirmed the doctrine in traditional terms...". Id. at 72-73.
[140] Id. at 77-78 and 78 n. 12.
[141] Id. at 77. See also id. at 78 n. 13.
[142] Id. at 77.
[143) Id. at 78.
[144] Id. at 78 n. 14.
[145] See, e.g., Williams, 694 F. 2d at 304 n. 5; lID, 461 F. Supp. at 397. See also
Atwood & Brewster, American Business Abroad, supra note 45, at 244-46; Note, Sherman Act
Jurisdiction,supra note 128, at 1247; Note, Antitrust Conspiracies,supra note 128, at 495.
[146] But see Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 81 (dissent) ("Where ...the wrong complained of is the role
played rather than the possible political reaction thereto, I think it wrong to predicate an act of
state defense upon the face of the pleadings:)
1147] Id. at 79.
[148] See, e.g., Note, JudicialBalancing,supra note 11, at 333-38.
[149] See generally, id. at 339-40; see, e.g., OPEC,649 F. 2d 1354 (oil); Occidentalof Unm al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F. 2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978); cert. denied, 442
U.S. 928 (1979) (oil); Asociacian de Reclamantes, 561 F. Supp. at 1190 (land); MOL, 572 F. Supp.
at 79 (native animals); Buttes Gas, 331 F. Supp. at 92 (oil).
[150] See DeRoburt, 548 F. Supp. at 1370 (libel action concerning loans made by foreign
government's development corporation); Frolova, 558 F. Supp. at 358 (denial of immigration).
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[151] See, e.g., Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 72, 73, 78; Occidental, 331 F. Supp. at 110; MOL, 572 F.
Supp. at 85; DeRoburt, 548 F. Supp. at 1374.
[152] See, e.g., Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 79; Asociacian de Reclamantes, 561 F. Supp. at 1198 n. 15,
1200; MOL, 572 F. Supp. at 86; DeRoburt, 548 F. Supp. at 1375.
[1531 376 U.S. at 423.
[1541 Id. at 433.
[155] See generally Falk, Domestic Courts,supra note 12, at 21-52.
[156] Id. at 42.
[1571 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429.
[1581 Id. at 432-36.
[159 Id. at 423.
[160] Id. at 428 (by considering only those disputes for which there are "agreed principle[s]",
courts avoid "the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national
interest or with international justice").
[1611 Id. at 434-35 (it is unlikely that "... the decisions of the courts of the world's major
capital exporting country and principal exponent of the free enterprise system would be accepted
as disinterested expressions of sound legal principle by those adhering to widely different
ideologies"). See also Dunhill,425 U.S. at 727 n. 12 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Stewart, and Blackmun, J.J.):
While Sabbatino found the act of state doctrine to reflect the "distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government," ... it has also been
suggested that a doctrine of deference based upon the absence of consensus as to
controlling principles of international law allocates legal competence among nations in a
manner that promotes the growth of international law [citations omitted].
[162] Id. at 435.
[163] See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703-06; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 900, 907-08. But see
Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 467 (White, J., dissenting) ("the Court, notwithstanding its protestations to
the contrary, has laid down an 'inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this case");
Atwood & Brewster, American Business Abroad, supra note 45 §8.05, at 241 ("The court may not
have had in mind an ad hoc balancing process..."); Note, JudicialBalancing,supra note 11, at 334
n. 24.
[164] Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705-06 n. 18 (White, J., for a plurality of the Court).
[165] Commentators and courts have not been in agreement about which opinions reflect a
balancing test analysis. Compare Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 900 n. 5 (in which the court noted that the
Dunhill plurality emphasized the concept of balancing interests, while the dissenters treated the act
of state doctrine in political question terms); with Note, Judicial Balancing, supra note 11, at
334-35 n. 25 (the commentators observed that in Dunhill, the plurality called for a strict
application of the act of state doctrine with a commercial activity exception and the dissenters
advocated a balancing test).
[1661 See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704 ("In their commercial capacities, foreign governments
do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those powers that can
also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same
rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch very sharply on 'national nerves'.")
[167] The leading case on the political question doctrine, Baker v. Carr, decided two years
before Sabbatino articulates factors for considering political question cases that range from the
clearly classical to the functional and prudential:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standard for resolving it; or the
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impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
369 U.S. at 217 [emphasis added]. See also supra note 107.
[168] Cf. Shapiro, Fathersand Sons: The Court, the Commentators,and the Search for Values, in
The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't 220 (ed. Blasi 1983).
[169] See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697.
[170] See OutboardMarine, 461 F. Supp. at 398 and n.28; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 908 ("... to
balance the equation of an act of state case, deference to FSIA intent and purpose must be
factored in to reflect the established interests of the legislative and executive branches of our
government').
[171] See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see generally Scharpf, Judicial Review, supra note 106, at
566-82 (1966).
[172] See Tribe, Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 71 n. 1
[173] See, e.g., Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 911 (where defendants engaged in sham litigation to
eliminate plaintiffs from the market and conspired with foreign and domestic sales agents to
receive illegal kickbacks, the court observed in dicta that the act of state doctrine should not be
used as "a shield made available simply because Defendant has joined foreign sovereign purchasing acts into its alleged antitrust conspiracy...").
[174] 425 U.S. at 682.
[175] Id. at 686-87.
[176] Id. at 697 n. 12, 706-11 (State Department Letter reprinted in opinion as Appendix 1);
id. at 724 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
[177] Id.
[178] In a three-part plurality opinion written by Justice White, three justices joined Part II
(discussing the burden of proof required for an act of state claim) and two concurred separately.
Part III (discussing the rationale for a commercial act exception) was joined by two justices with
Justice Powell concurring separately. Justice Powell is cryptic: he admits that "the line between
commercial and political acts of a foreign state often will be difficult to delineate". id. at 715, but
concludes that he "can foresee ...[no] cases involving only the commercial acts of a foreign state"
which should require judicial abstention. Id.
[179] Id. at 694-95.
[180] After Dunhill was decided, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), see supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text, incorporating a commercial act exception
in the application of jurisdictional immunity of foreign states. The legislation does not affect the
act of state doctrine, see, e.g., OPEC,649 F. 2d at 1360 ("The act of state doctrine is not diluted
by the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity") nor did
Congress intend that it should; but see Note, Political Question, supra note 30, at 735-36.
Nevertheless, some courts have suggested that the FSIA does modify the act of state doctrine by
adding an exception for commercial acts, see, e-g., Allied Bank International,566 F. Supp. at 1443
n. 2; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 907 ("The clear trend is toward application of a commercial activity
exception to the Act of State Doctrine for reasons espoused by the Dunhill plurality and to
effectuate the legislative intent that the FSIA not be undermined by improper assertion of the act
of state defense....")
[181] Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 696-98, 697 n. 12. See also id. at 715 (Powell. J.,concurring); at
724-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Justice White quite properly does not rely specifically upon
the views of the [State] Department- ...[the Court's disapproval of the Bernstein exception
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minimizes] ... the significance of any letter from the Department of State... "). See generallvsupra
notes 42, 79-84 and accompanying text.
[182] 425 U.S. at 703. 705.
[183] Id. at 695.
[1841 Id. at 697.
[185] Sabbatino.376 U.S. at 423.
[1861 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697 (emphasis added).
[1871 This view has sometimes been characterized as the "embarrassment doctrine". Singer.
Act of State Doctrineof the United Kingdom, supra note 26. at 291.
11881 See Sabbauno, 376 U.S. at 434-35. See also Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 725, 727 n. 12 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
[189] 425 U.S. at 705-06 n. 18.
[190] Id. (quoting the State Department with evident approval).
[191] Id. at 726-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[192] Id. at 726, quoting Sabbatmo, 376 U.S. at 438.
[193] See 425 U.S. at 695. But see id. at 718 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine
required neither formal decrees nor active conduct).
1194] 425 U.S. at 694. Justice White searched the record, id. at 690, but could not find a
convincing factual representation, id. at 691 n. 8.
[1951 Id. at 695.
[1961 549 F. 2d at 597.
[1971 See e.g., Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 608 ("... plaintiffs here apparently complain of
additional agreements and actions which are totally unrelated to the Honduran government. These
separate activities would clearly be unprotected even if procurement of a Honduran act of state
were one part of defendants' overall scheme"). See also United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 276 (1927) (defendants, having conspired to monopolize the sale of sisal, could not invoke an
act of state defense because the conduct included acts performed within the United States).
[198] As Justice Jackson observed of the Supreme Court: "We are not final because we are
infallable, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown u. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953).
[1991 See Bickel. Passive Virtues, supra note 106, at 46, 75 (written in reaction to the classical
model described by Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 106); see also Henkin. Political
Question" Doctrine,supra note 106; Bickel, Dangerous Branch, supra note 106, at 172.
[200] See Bickel, Dangerous Branch, supra note 106, at 23-28, 69-71; Finkelstein, Judicial
Self-Lunitation, supra note 106, at 361. Cf. OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1359.
12011 See, e.g., OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1360.
[202] See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 607.
[203] See, e.g., Mannington Mills, 595 F. 2d at 1294 (critical question is whether "the crucial
acts occurred as a rsult of a considered policy determination by a government to give effect to its
political and public interests - matters that would have significant impact on American foreign
relations"); accord Williams, 694 F. 2d at 303.
[2041 See, e.g., Williams, 694 F. 2d at 304 ("The act of state doctrine should not be applied to
thwart legitimate American regulatory goals in the absence of a showing that adjudication may
hinder international relations"); IID, 594 F. 2d at 55 ("Precluding all inquiry into the motivation
behind or circumstances surrounding the sovereign act would uselessly thwart legitimate American
goals where adjudication would result in no embarrassment to executive department action").
1205] See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [Alcoa].
[206] See Mannington Mills, 595 F. 2d at 1292-94.
[2071 See liD, 594 F. 2d at 55.
12081 See Timberlane,549 F. 2d at 608.
[2091 See OutboardMarine, 461 F. Supp. at 398.
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[210] See Williams, 694 F. 2d at 303-04; Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 911.
1211] See, e.g., OPEC,649 F. 2d at 1354 (oil); Hunt, 550 F. 2d 68 (oil); Buttes Gas, 461 F. 2d at
1261 (oil).
[212] See, e.g., OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1354 (OPEC nations); MontrealTrading.Ltd. V.A max Inc.,
661 F. 2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,455 U.S. 1001 (1982) (Canada); Bokkelen v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (Brazil). See also Note, Judicial Balancing
supra note 11, at 339-40 and accompanying notes. But see Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 706
(where Canadian-based subsidiary had blocked plaintiff's access to Canadian market, act of state
defense did not apply since there was no indication that the Canadian government "approved or
would have approved" efforts to monopolize).
(213] 549 F. 2d at 597.
[214] Id. at 604-05.
[215] Id. at 601. The lower court also dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
[2161 Id. at 603, 608, 615. In assessing the jurisdictional question, Judge Choy articulated a
sophisticated "jurisdictional rule of reason", id. at 613-15, which balanced the conflicts between
national and foreign interests. This balancing test closely resembles that employed by courts
adopting a prudential approach to act of state questions. The "jurisdictional rule", however, was
used by the court in Timberlane to decide the jurisdictional question and not to decide the act of
state question. The court treats these two questions as different questions requiring different kinds
of analysis. Id. at 615 n. 34. Other courts have not seen the difference and have incorporated the
Timberlane "jurisdictional rule" into their act of state analysis, see, e.g., Sage, 534 F. Supp. at
902-04.
1217] Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; accord Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 606.
[218] 549 F. 2d at 607.
12191 See The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §41,
Comment d (1965), quoted in Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 607-08:
An "act of state" as the term is used in this Title involves the public interests of a state as a
state, as distinct from its interest in providing the means of adjudicating disputes or claims
that arise within its territory.... A judgment of a court may be an act of state. Usually it is
not, because it involves the interests of private litigants or because court adjudication is not
the usual way in which the state exercises its jurisdiction to give effect to public interests.
[220] See OPEC,649 F. 2d at 1360; see also Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 78 n. 14 and accompanying
text.
[221] See OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1360; Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 78-79. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act distinguishes between analyses based on the nature of the act and analyses based
on the state's motives, 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611, see supranotes 94-104 and accompanying text. A
test based upon the transaction examines the nature of the act, the expectations of the participants,
and the course of dealings. A test based upon the state's purposes looks to the state to define the
act since even commercial acts may have political and economic purposes not apparent in the act.
[222] 549 F. 2d at 608.
[223] Id. at 608.
[224] P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 105 (Supp. 1982).
[224] See Mannington Mills, 595 F. 2d at 1292-94.
[226] See 1ID, 594 F. 2d at 55.
[227] See Timberlane, 549 F. 2d at 606.
[228] 649 F. 2d at 1354.
[229] Id. at 1355-57.
[230] Id. at 1359, 1361,
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[2311
[2321
[233]
[2341

Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1360-61.
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
See Bickel. Passive Virtues, supra note 106, at 75:

Such is the basis of the political-question doctrine: the court's sense of lack of capacity.
compounded in unequal parts of the strangeness of the issue and the suspicion that it will
have to yield more often and more substantially to expediency than to principle; the sheer
momentousness of it, which unbalances judgment and prevents one from subsuming the
normal calculations of probabilities; the anxiety not so much that judicial judgment will be
ignored, as that perhaps it should be but won't; finally and in sum ["in a mature
democracy"], the inner vulnerability of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and
has no earth to draw strength from.
1235] 649 F. 2d at 1358.
[236] Id. See also Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432, quoted infra at note 240.
[237] See supra note 234, quoting in full this view.
[238] 649 F. 2d at 1360.
[239] Id. at 1361.
1240] Id. See also Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 432-33 ("Piecemeal dispositions of this sort involving
the probability of affront to another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried
on by the Executive Branch and might prevent or render less favorable the terms of an agreement
that could otherwise be reached.")
1241] See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
[2421 649 F. 2d at 1359.
12431 Id.
[244] 550 F. 2d at 68.
[245] 649 F. 2d at 1360.
[246] Id. at 1360 ("... because the act of state doctrine addresses concerns central to our
system of government, the doctrine must necessarily remain a part of our jurisprudence unless and
until such time as a radical change in the role of the courts occurs").
[247] 376 U.S. at 428.
[248] Id. at 434.
[249] See OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1358:
The political branches of our government are able to consider the competing economic and
political considerations and respond to the public will in order to carry on foreign relations
in accordance with the best interests of the country as a whole. The courts, in contrast,
focus on single disputes and make decisions on the basis of legal principles. The timing of
our decisions is largely a result of our caseload and of the random tactical considerations
which motivate parties to bring lawsuits.... When the courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of state, they risk disruption of our country's
international diplomacy.
See also Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 900 ("However it is understood in theoretical terms, a practical
application of the doctrine requires a balancing process which will lead to some variance in results
depending on how the subjective factors are weighted.") See generally, Note, JudicialBalancing.
supra note 11, at 339-41.
1250] Sabbatmo, 376 U.S. at 432. See also Falk, Domestic Courts, supra note 12, at 8-9
("Deference ... is a way of getting the controversy out of the courts and into the foreign office").
[251] See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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[252] Compare Hunt, 550 F. 2d at 78 (the act of state doctrine applied because the antitrust
claim required consideration of Libya's motivation in a nationalization) with Tiniberlane,549 F. 2d
at 608 (the act of state doctrine did not apply because the involvement of the Honduran courts
indicated no active state interest).
[253] See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705 n. 18 (proposing that national interests be weighed against
"that injury to the private party, who is denied justice through judicial deference to a raw assertion
of sovereignty..."); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 435 ("It is contended that ... it is the function of the
courts to justly decide individual disputes before them... [blut it is difficult to regard the claim of
the original owner, who otherwise may be recompensed through diplomatic channels, as ... [being
superior to] the innocent third party purchaser, who, if the property is taken from him, is without
any remedy.")
[254] See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698-706.
[255] See generally Falk, Domestic Courts, supra note 12; see also Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 430;
OPEC, 649 F. 2d at 1361.
This question is made clearly raised in the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. In
Alcoa, 148 F. 2d at 443, Judge Hand cautioned that "[a]lmost any limitation of the supply of goods
in Europe, for example, ... may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between
the two. Yet when one considers the international complications likely to arise from an effort in
this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress did not intend
the Act to cover them." Accord ContinentialOre Co. v. Union Carbide,370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962); see
Falk, Domestic Courts, supra note 12, at 37.
[256] See Sabbaino, 376 U.S. at 434-35.
[257] Id. at 432, 434.
1258] See supra notes 205-212 and accompanying text, discussing application of U.S. antitrust
laws.
[259] See generally Falk, Domestic Courts,supra note 12.
[260] Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, J.). See also Falk, Domestic Courts,
supra note 12, at 2.
[261] Cf. Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver By Conduct: A Possible Response to the
Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. 1 (1984).
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